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REVISION OF THE LAW OF MARRIAGE: ONE
BABY STEP FORWARD
Katherine Shaw Spaht*
Introduction
After six years of drafting and redrafting, the Louisiana Law In-
stitute completed work on a proposal revising the law on entry into,
nullity and the personal effects of marriage. The proposal was introduced
and ultimately enacted at the 1987 legislative session. Act Number 886
revised Civil Code articles 86 through 136 and the corresponding pro-
visions of the Civil Code Ancillaries. 1
The process employed by the Law Institute is lengthy and delib-
erative. In addition to serious questions of policy, the Institute is con-
cerned with assuring that amendments to the Civil Code use terminology
and concepts consistent with usage in other parts of the Code. Research
is conducted and preliminary drafting done by the Reporter 2 with the
assistance of a research attorney.' The preliminary draft of proposed
articles and the accompanying comments are then submitted to the
Committee.4 After the Committee finally approves the proposed legis-
lation, it is presented to the Council of the Law Institute.5 The Council
may approve, reject or recommit the legislation to the Committee. Once
Copyright 1988, by LOUISIANA LAw REvIEw.
* Professor of Law, Louisiana State University.
1. 1987 La. Acts No. 886.
2. The Reporter for the Persons Committee of the Louisiana Law Institute is the
author of this article.
3. The research attorney for the Persons Committee of the Institute is Leonard W.
Martin.
4. Members of the Persons Committee of the Louisiana Law Institute are primarily
responsible for the quality of the provisions of 1987 La. Acts No. 886. They are Justice
Fred A. Blanche, Eavelyn T. Brooks, Professor Thomas E. Carbonneau, Professor Kathryn
V. Lorio, Judge E. Donald Moseley, Professor Cynthia A. Samuel, Philip R. Reigel, Jr.
and Kenneth Rigby.
Another legislative product of this same committee, La. Civ. Code art. 161 (claims for
contributions to a spouse's education), was discussed in Spaht, Developments in the Law,
1985-1986-Persons and Matrimonial Regimes, 47 La. L. Rev. 391 (1986).
5. The Council of the Institute is its governing body and presently consists of 39
ex-officio, 31 elected, and 31 appointed members. The list of members is found in The
Twenty-Fourth Biennial Report of the Louisiana State Law Institute to the Legislature of
Louisiana (April, 1986). The Louisiana Law Institute was created by 1938 La. Acts No.
166, § 4, para. 9.
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the legislation has received final Council approval, it is submitted to
the Coordinating Committee6 for specific considerations of language and
conceptual consistency. Thereafter, the proposed legislation with a report
from the Coordinating Committee returns to the Council of the Institute
for final approval.
The three principal chapters of the Civil Code that were revised
were marriage, nullity of marriage, and incidents and effects of marriage.
In the chapter of the Civil Code regulating entry into marriage, the
Committee decided that the Civil Code articles should only contain the
essential requirements of a valid marriage. Any provision that did not
affect the validity of the marriage was removed to the Louisiana Revised
Statutes. In the chapter entitled "Nullity of Marriage" the focus of the
Committee was to simplify, clarify and, in one special case, change the
law. The chapter of the Code that imposes personal obligations upon
the spouses is virtually identical to the corresponding chapter effective
before January 1, 1988, 7 reflecting the Committee view that the law
should regulate, to the least extent possible, the personal relationship
created by marriage.'
In addition to the Civil Code articles, the provisions of the Civil
Code Ancillaries regulating the same subject matter9 were amended. The
Committee was concerned with reorganizing the Louisiana Revised Sta-
tutes in a logical pattern and eliminating duplication. One new Code
of Civil Procedure article was enacted10 to implement a change in the
6. Professor Cary DeBessonet is Reporter of the Coordinating Committee. Assisting
him as members of his committee are Shael Herman, Carlos E. Lazarus, Professor Allain
Levasseur, Professor Saul Litvinoff, and Professor A. N. Yiannopoulos. Stan Raborn
serves as secretary for the Committee.
The functions of the Coordinating Committee are (1) to coordinate the activities of the
Institute Committees, including determining whether the language, rules and underlying
policies of the revision proposals are consistent with each other and with retained portions
of the Civil Code, and (2) to evaluate revision proposals for style, internal logical
consistency and perspicuity.
7. 1987 La. Acts No. 886, § 7: "This Act shall become effective on January 1,
1988."
8. See La. Civ. Code arts. 98-100 (as amended by 1987 La. Acts No. 886, § 1).
See also infra text accompanying notes 167-84.
9. Code Book I, Code Title IV, ch. 1, §§ 201-263 of Title IX of the Louisiana
Revised Statutes. 1987 La. Acts No. 886, § 3 (eff. Jan. 1, 1988).
10. La. Code Civ. P. art. 74.3 (as added by 1987 La. Acts No. 886, § 2 (eff. Jan.
1, 1988)): "Persons related by adoption seeking judicial authorization to marry in ac-
cordance with Civil Code Article 90 shall request authorization of the district court in
the parish of either party's domicile." See discussion of this provision infra text accom-
panying notes 47-55.
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law affecting the marriages of collateral relations." The only transitional
provision of Act Number 886 also concerned the marriages of collateral
relations. 12
Entry Into Marriage
Marriage is defined in Civil Code article 86 as "a legal relationship
between a man and a woman that is created by civil contract."' 3 The
predecessor to Article 86"4 described marriage as a civil contract. The
historical reasons for this description of marriage no longer exist;
furthermore, the philosophical underpinning of contract as a source of
all human institutions has been either forgotten or long since accepted. 16
The jurisprudence has always accepted the proposition that marriage is
not simply a contract, but rather a legal relationship that differs markedly
from other contractual relationships. 7 It creates a "social status that
11. La. Civ. Code art. 90 (as amended by 1987 La. Acts No. 886, § I (eff. Jan.
1, 1988)): "Nevertheless, persons related by adoption, though not by blood, in the collateral
line within the fourth degree may marry each other if they obtain judicial authorization
in writing to do so."
12. 1987 La. Acts No. 886, § 5 (eff. Jan. 1, 1988): "Notwithstanding the provisions
of Civil Code Articles 90 and 94, or of any other provision of this Act, marriages between
collateral relations contracted prior to September 11, 1981, shall continue to be legal and
of full effect on and after the effective date of this Act."
The collateral marriages to which section 5 refers are those ratified by periodic amend-
ment (the last effective on Sept. 11, 1981) to La. Civ. Code art. 95 (1870), which was
effective before January 1, 1988, and which read: "All such marriages [between collateral
relations] heretofore made in contravention of the above provisions shall be considered
as legal."
13. La. Civ. Code art. 86 (amended by 1987 La. Acts No. 886, § I (eff. Jan. 1,
1988)).
14. La. Civ. Code art. 86 (1870): "The law considers marriage in no other view than
as a civil contract."
15. "The cited articles (La. Civ. Code arts. 86-89 (1870)) announce clearly enough
that Louisiana law, not any other law, controls all aspects of marriage. Ecclesiastical
jurisdiction, certainly, cannot be admitted under these provisions." Pascal and Spaht,
Louisiana Family Law Course 6 (4th ed. 1986). See also discussion of religious authorities'
assertion of jurisdiction over marriage in Planiol, Traite Elementaire de Droit Civil Nos.
699-702, 847 (La. St. L. Inst. transl. 1959).
16. Pascal and Spaht, Louisiana Family Law Course 7 (4th ed. 1986):
Why the term "civil contract", however, and not "civil institution" or "secular
institution"? The explanation may be the fact that the prevailing philosophies
of the eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries considered all human institutions,
even law itself, to have their roots in contract. The philosophies of Locke and
Rousseau are examples.
17. See, e.g., Stallings v. Stallings, 177 La. 488, 148 So. 687 (1933); Hurry v. Hurry,
144 La. 877, 81 So. 378 (1919). In the Hurry case, the court described the differences
between marriage and other contracts as follows:
The consent of the parties is required, but it can only be contracted between
1988] 1133
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affects not only the .contracting parties, but also their posterity and the
good order of society."'" Because it is a state governed relationship
created by a civil19 contract, marriage is regulated, for the most part, 20
by "special rules prescribed by law.' '21
a male and a female; the parties must be able to contract, not in the sense of
having attained their majority, for a male of 14 and a female of 12 may marry
under the law of this state; but they must not at the time be lawfully married
to any one else, and must not be of those classes which the law prohibits from
marrying, such as close relatives, persons of the black and white races, etc.
Unlike other contracts, it can be made with but one person at a time, and
cannot be dissolved by the consent of the parties. 144 La. at 885, 81 So. at
380-81 (1919).
The fact that it can be contracted only between a man and a woman led to the inclusion
of that descriptive prepositional phrase into the definition of marriage prior to 1988 (La.
Civ. Code art. 88 (1870)) and thereafter in La. Civ. Code art. 86 (as amended by 1987
La. Acts No. 886, § I (eff. Jan. 1, 1988)). For an interesting observation as to why that
is necessary, see Adams v. Adams, 357 So. 2d 881 n.1 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1978).
See also La. Civ. Code art. 86, comment (c) (as amended by 1987 La. Acts No. 886,
§ 1 (eff. Jan. 1, 1988)).
18. La. Civ. Code art. 86, comment (c) (as amended by 1987 La. Acts No. 886, §
1 (eff. Jan. 1, 1988)).
19. La. Civ. Code art. 86 (as amended by 1987 La. Acts No. 886, § 1 (eff. Jan.
1, 1988)).
In particular, the import of Article 86 of the Civil Code of 1870 remains
unchanged: the law views marriage as purely a civil matter, and not as one
subject to the operation of religious or ecclesiastical law. The term "civil" in
former Article 86 has been retained in order to emphasize that continuity of
policy.
Id. comment (a).
La. Civ. Code art. 86 (1870) before its amendment and reenactment read simply: "The
law considers marriage in no other view than as a civil contract." See also supra notes
15 and 16.
20. There are occasions where it will be necessary to resort to general obligations
principles to resolve questions unanswered by the special rules in Chapters 1 or 2 of Title
IV of Book I of the Civil Code. Since marriage is created by a civil contract, it is
appropriate in many instances to do so.
The minutes of the meeting of the Persons Committee of the Law Institute on October
30, 1981, reflect the following discussion: "Several members ... agreed that such an
absolute bar [against resort to general obligations principles] was unwise, but disapproved
adopting the converse provision that obligations principles could always be applied unless
their use was explicitly disapproved."
However, it must be remembered, as comment (b) to La. Civ. Code art. 86 (as amended
by 1987 La. Acts No. 886, § 1 (eff. Jan. 1, 1988)) cautions: "The provisions of this
revision, as a general rule, are not intended to overrule the established jurisprudence
holding that certain laws regulating marriage and the relationship of husband and wife
are matters of public order from which the parties may not derogate by contract."
21. La. Civ. Code art. 86 (as amended by 1987 La. Acts No. 886, § 1 (eff. Jan 1,
1988)). The special rules referred to are those in Title IV of Book I of the Civil Code
and Chapter I of Code Title IV of the Civil Code Ancillaries in Title 9 of the Louisiana
Revised Statutes.
1134 [Vol. 48
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The second article of Chapter 1 contains the essential elements of
a valid marriage. There must be no legal impediment, a marriage cer-
emony, and the free consent of the parties "to take each other as
husband and wife, expressed at the ceremony." 22 After much discussion,
the Committee concluded that any provision that did not directly affect
the validity of the marriage did not belong in the Civil Code. As a
consequence, provisions of the Code addressing the marriage of minors23
and ceremonial requirements, such as a marriage license, 24 the seventy-
two hour waiting period,2" and the number of witnesses at the ceremony 26
were shifted to the Revised Statutes.
27
Impediments to Marriage
As comment (b) to article 87 explains, "[a] person may contract
marriage if he is not prohibited from doing so .... ,,2 The articles
which follow contain the impediments to marriage-an existing mar-
riage, 29 the same sex,30 and relationship by consanguinity or by adop-
tion.3 By omission, it is clear that minority is not an impediment to
22. La. Civ. Code art. 87 (as amended by 1987 La. Acts No. 886, § 1 (eff. Jan 1,
1988)). Comment (a) explains that the three listed requirements are the only necessary
prerequistes to a valid marriage: "Physical consummation is not necessary."
23. La. Civ. Code arts. 92, 97, 112 (1870).
24. La. Civ. Code arts. 99, 104 (1870).
25. La. Civ. Code art. 99 (1870).
26. La. Civ. Code art. 105 (1870).
27. La. R.S. 9:211 to 214 (as amended by 1987 La. Acts No. 886, § 3 (eff. Jan 1,
1988)) (marriage of minors); La. R.S. 9:221 to 225 (as amended by 1987 La. Acts No.
886, § 3 (eff. Jan. 1, 1988)) (marriage license); La. R.S. 9:241 to 243 (as amended by
1987 La. Acts No. 886, § 3 (eff. Jan. 1, 1988)) (seventy-two-hour waiting period); La.
R.S. 9:244 to 245 (as amended by 1987 La. Acts No. 886, § 3 (eff. Jan. 1, 1988))
(witnesses and marriage certificate).
La. Civ. Code art. 87, comment (c) (as amended by 1987 La. Acts No. 886, § 1 (eff.
Jan. 1, 1988)):
Instead of referring to "the forms and solemnities prescribed by law," as did
Article 90 of the Civil Code of 1870, this Article uses the more specific term
"ceremony." This change is intended to emphasize that the only essential "for-
mal" prerequisite to a valid marriage is a ceremony conducted in accordance
with Article 91, infra.
28. La. Civ. Code art. 87, comment (b) (as amended by 1987 La. Acts No. 886, §
I (eff. Jan. 1, 1988)).
29. La. Civ. Code art. 88 (as amended by 1987 La. Acts No. 886, § I (eff. Jan.
1, 1988)).
30. La. Civ. Code art. 89 (as amended by 1987 La. Acts No. 886, § I (eff. Jan.
1, 1988)).
31. La. Civ. Code art. 90 (as amended by 1987 La. Acts No. 886, § I (eff. Jan.
1, 1988)).
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a marriage. 2 Just as under prior law, the officiant is directed not to
perform a marriage in which a party is a minor unless ". . . the minor
has the written consent to marry of both of his parents, or of the tutor
of his person, or of a person who has been awarded custody of the
minor." 33 If the minor is under the age of sixteen,3 4 he or she must
also obtain judicial authorization to marry. 5 The choice to continue the
present jurisprudential rule concerning the marriage of minors was con-
scious. The Committee chose to preserve the validity of such marriages
because, given the frequency of the marriage of minors, serious social
problems could result from a law pronouncing the nullity of such a
marriage.
A person who is presently married may not contract another mar-
riage. If the first marriage is absolutely null, however, it does not
constitute an impediment to a second marriage.36 It is unnecessary under
article 94 to first obtain a declaration of nullity if the first marriage is
32. La. Civ. Code art. 87 (as amended by 1987 La. Acts No. 886, § 1 (eff. Jan.
1, 1988)):
This rule applies to minors as well as majors, in the sense that once a minor
has contracted marriage that marriage is valid. This revision does not change
the prior jurisprudential rule that the Louisiana statutory provisions imposing
an age requirement for marriage in general and special third-party consent
requirements for marriages of minors are only directory to officiants. State v.
Golden, 210 La. 347, 26 So. 2d 837 (1946).
Id. comment (b).
33. La. R.S. 9:211(A) (as amended by 1987 La. Acts No. 886, § 3 (eff. Jan. 1,
1988)); cf. La. Civ. Code art. 92 (1870) as interpreted in State v. Golden, 210 La. 347,
26 So. 2d 837 (1946).
34. Compare La. R.S. 9:211(B) (as amended by 1987 La. Acts No. 886, § 3 (eff.
Jan. 1, 1988)) with La. Civ. Code art. 92, which directed the celebrant not to marry a
female under the age of sixteen and a male under the age of eighteen. The distinction
drawn on the basis of sex was probably unconstitutional. See Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S.
190, 97 S. Ct. 451 (1976), and Bilbe, Constitutionality of Sex-Based Differentiations in
the Louisiana Community Property Regime, 19 Loy. L. Rev. 373 (1972).
35. La. R.S. 9:211(B) (as amended by 1987 La. Acts No. 886, § 3 (eff. Jan. 1,
1988)): "A minor under the age of sixteen must also obtain written authorization to
marry from the judge of the court exercising juvenile jurisdiction in the parish where the
minor resides or the marriage ceremony is to be performed."
Furthermore, the provision that follows section 211 permits a judge to authorize the
minor's marriage regardless of his age without parental consent "when there is a compelling
reason why the marriage should take place." La. R.S. 9:212 (as amended by 1987 La.
Acts No. 886, § 3 (eff. Jan. 1, 1988)).
36. La. Civ. Code art. 88, comment (c) (as amended by 1987 La. Acts No. 886, §
1 (eff. Jan. 1, 1988)):
An undissolved marriage is an impediment to either spouse's subsequent marriage.
A bigamous, incestuous, or otherwise absolutely null union is not. A party to
such a union may lawfully marry even though the nullity of his prior union
has never been judicially pronounced. Coon v. Monroe Scrap Material Co., 191
So. 607 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1939).
1136 [Vol. 4)8
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absolutely null;3 7 thus, the theoretical distinction between absolute and
relative nullities is maintained.38
When both parties are of the same sex, the second impediment to
a marriage arises.39 The prohibition of same sex marriages is consistent
with prior legislation 4" and jurisprudence. 4 However, the new revision
addresses the impediment in a separate article rather than as a part of
the definition of marriage. 42 The same sex marriage is absolutely nul 43
and, furthermore, is incapable of producing civil effects." Thus, even
though a party to a same sex marriage may believe that there is no
impediment to his marriage, and for that reason be considered in good
faith, civil effects will not flow in his favor. This choice by the Council
of the Law Institute was based upon the fact that what had been
contracted could not be considered a marriage.4 Left unanswered is the
question of the transsexual, who is genetically a member of one sex
but by virtue of surgery and hormone treatments is anatomically a
member of the other sex. 6
37. La. Civ. Code art. 94 (as amended by 1987 La. Acts No. 886, § 1 (eff. Jan.
1, 1988)): "A judicial declaration of nullity is not required, but an action to recognize
the nullity may be brought by any interested person."
38. Compare La. Civ. Code arts. 2030 and 2031.
39. La. Civ. Code art. 89 (as amended by 1987 La. Acts No. 886, § I (eff. Jan.
1, 1988)): "Persons of the same sex may not contract marriage with each other."
40. La. Civ. Code art. 88 (1870).
41. No Louisiana jurisprudence ever recognized the validity of a marriage between
persons of the same sex, despite the footnote in Adams v. Adams, 357 So. 2d 881 n.1
(La. App. 1st Cir. 1978) which reads: "This language once unnecessary, is used because
of nondiscriminatory legislation, the import of which allows marriages between persons
of the same sex, a relatively new phenomenon in our society."
In other jurisdictions, prohibitions similar to that found in prior La. Civ. Code art.
88 (1870) have been unsuccessfully challenged as unconstitutional. See, e.g., Baker v.
Nelson, 291 Minn. 310, 191 N.W. 2d 185 (1971), appeal dismissed, 409 U.S. 810, 93 S.
Ct. 37 (1972). Consider also the impact of Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 106 S.
Ct. 2841 (1986).
42. See supra note 41.
43. La. Civ. Code art. 94 (as amended by 1987 La. Acts No. 886, § I (eff, Jan.
1, 1988)).
44. La. Civ. Code art. 96 (as amended by 1987 La. Acts No. 886, § 1 (eff. Jan.
1, 1988)): "A purported marriage between parties of the same sex does not produce any
civil effects" (emphasis added).
45. La. Civ. Code art. 86 (as amended by 1987 La. Acts No. 886, § I (eff. Jan.
1, 1988)): "Marriage is a legal relationship between a man and a woman that is created
by civil contract" (emphasis added). See also La. Civ. Code art. 96, supra note 44.
46. See, e.g., Note, Transsexual Marriages: Are They Valid Under California Law?
16 Sw. U.L. Rev. 505 (1986); Note, Is He or Isn't She? Transsexualism: Legal Impediments
to Integrating a Product of Medical Definition and Technology, 21 Washburn L.J. 342
(1982).
The problem of the transsexual who marries another unsuspecting party might have
113719881
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More significant changes were made in the Civil Code article that
prohibits marriages on the basis of the parties' relationship. Under prior
law it was unclear whether the prohibition applied to those related by
adoption, or only those related by consanguinity. 47 Before deciding whether
the article should explicitly extend to those related by adoption, the
Persons Committee explored the reasons for the prohibition. The pro-
hibition probably was founded upon "empirical observation of the harm-
ful genetic effects of such marriages"' ' and "moral considerations growing
out of the need to preserve peace within the family and to expand
family fortune and influence through intermarriage with other family
or tribal groups . . . . -49 If both reasons were the bases of the prohibition
against the marriage of related persons, then the Committee reasoned
that the impediment should exist as to relationships created by adoption.50
Those persons related in the ascending and descending line or in
the collateral line within the fourth degree5" may not marry. "Within
the fourth degree" includes collateral relations through first cousins . 2
been considered solved by using the language in La. Civ. Code art. 91 (1870): "mistake
respecting the person." That phrase has been eliminated from La. Civ. Code art. 93 (as
amended by 1987 La. Acts No. 886, § 1 (eff. Jan. 1, 1988)). However, the court is not
precluded from resorting to general principles of obligations law, such as error, La. Civ.
Code arts. 1949-1950, to dispose of unanswered problems. See supra note 20 and infra
text accompanying notes 94-97.
47. La. Civ. Code arts. 94 and 95 (1870) were not explicit. La. Civ. Code art. 214
(1870) provides that an adopted person "is to be considered for all purposes as the
legitimate child and forced heir of the adoptive parent or parents . . ." (emphasis added).See comment (e) to La. Civ. Code art. 90 (as amended by 1987 La. Acts No. 886, §
1 (eff. Jan. 1, 1988)).
48. La. Civ. Code art. 90, comment (c) (as amended by 1987 La. Acts No. 886, §
1 (eff. Jan. 1, 1988)).
49. Id.
50. La. Civ. Code art. 90 (as amended by 1987 La. Acts No. 886, § 1 (eff. Jan.
1, 1988)): "The impediment exists whether the persons are related by consanguinity or
by adoption."
51. La. Civ. Code art. 90 (as amended by 1987 La. Acts No. 886, § I (eff. Jan.
1, 1988)):
The following persons, whether legitimate or illegitimate, may not contract
marriage with each other:
Ascendants and descendants.
Collaterals within the fourth degree, whether of the whole or of the half
blood.
The impediment exists whether the persons are related by consanguinity or
by adoption. Nevertheless, persons related by adoption, though not by blood,
in the collateral line within the fourth degree may marry each other if they
obtain judicial authorization in writing to do so.
52. La. Civ. Code art. 901:
The series of degrees forms the line. The direct line is the series of degrees
between persons who descend one from another. The collateral line is the series
1138 [Vol. 48
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However, as to collaterals related by adoption, the article permits the
parties to obtain judicial authorization to marry." This provision was
borrowed from the Quebec Civil Code.4 The authorization may be
obtained from the district judge in the parish of either party's domicile."
The article does not specify whether the authorization is to be obtained
in advance of the ceremony or thereafter.5 6 The comments do suggest
that in deciding whether to authorize such a marriage, the judge "should
consider whether the policy of preserving family harmony will be ad-
vanced or impeded by the proposed union."
'5 7
The predecessor article which contained the prohibition against in-
termarriage of collateral relations had been periodically amended to
"ratify" marriages contracted in contravention of its provisions.,' The
consensus of the Persons Committee was that the "ratification" provision
should be included as a separate section of the bill to protect persons
whose marriages had been declared legal (those celebrated before Sep-
tember 11, 1981).19 However, the Committee approved the enactment
of degrees between persons who do not descend one from another, but who
descend from a common ancestor.
In the direct line, the number of degrees is equal to the number of generations
between the heir and the deceased. In the collateral line, the number of degrees
is equal to the number of generations between the heir and the common ancestor,
plus the number of generations between the common ancestor and the deceased.
See also La. Civ. Code art. 90, comment (b) (as amended by 1987 La. Acts No. 886,
§ I (eff. Jan. 1, 1988)): "The phrase 'collaterals within the fourth degree' includes aunt
and nephew, uncle and niece, siblings, and first cousins."
53. La. Civ. Code art. 90 (as amended by 1987 La. Acts No. 886, § I (eff. Jan.
1, 1988)): "Nevertheless, persons related by adoption, though not by blood, in the collateral
line within the fourth degree may marry each other if they obtain judicial authorization
in writing to do so" (emphasis added).
The parenthetical "though not by blood" recognizes the possiblity that a person may
adopt another person to whom he is related by consanguinity-i.e., a parent's illegitimate
child (La. R.S. 9:434 (3) (4) (Supp. 1987)) or a grandparent's grandchild (La. R.S. 9:434
(5) (Supp. 1987)). The two instances mentioned concern adoption in the direct line which
may create an adoptive relationship where a blood relationship already existed in the
collateral line.
54. Quebec Civ. Code art. 406 (rev. 1981): "In cases of adoption, the court may,
according to circumstances, permit a marriage in the collateral line."
55. La. Code Civ. P. art. 74.3 (as added by 1987 La. Acts No. 886, § 2 (eff. Jan.
1, 1988)).
56. La. Civ. Code art. 90, comment (f) (as amended by 1987 La. Acts No. 886, §
I (eff. Jan. 1, 1988)).
57. La. Civ. Code art. 90, comment (e) (as amended by 1987 La. Acts No. 886, §
I (eff. Jan. 1, 1988)).
58. La. Civ. Code art. 95 (1870): "All such marriages heretofore made in contravention
of the above provisions shall be considered as legal."
59. 1987 La. Acts No. 886, § 5 (eff. Jan. 1, 1988): "Notwithstanding the provisions
of Civil Code Articles 90 and 94, or of any other provision of this Act, marriages between
collateral relations contracted prior to September 11, 1981, shall continue to be legal and
of full effect on and after the effective date of this Act."
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of a prohibition against marriages of collaterals, with simultaneous rat-
ification of such marriages contracted by persons who had chosen to
either ignore the law or flaunt it.
Ceremony
The second prerequisite to a valid marriage is a marriage ceremony
at which the parties are physically present. 60 A "marriage" without a
marriage ceremony is absolutely null. 61 Physical participation by the
parties eliminates the possibility of marriage by telephone or other
telecommunication device, which an earlier Attorney General's opinion
suggested was possible,62 or by procuration, which is expressly prohib-
ited. 63 The reason for the requirement of physical presence at the cer-
emony is to permit the officiant to examine the parties to determine if
consent is freely given." Another possibility eliminated by the require-
ment of the parties' physical presence is that the ceremony might be
performed in stages with the prospective spouses making the necessary
avowals at different times not in each other's presence.
The third person who performs the ceremony must be either qual-
ified, or reasonably believed by the parties to be qualified. Qualification
consists of (1) membership in a class of religious personnel and (2)
registration. 65 In addition, judges and justices of peace" may perform
60. La. Civ. Code art. 91 (as amended by 1987 La. Acts No. 886, § 1 (eff. Jan.
1, 1988)): "The parties must participate in a marriage ceremony performed by a third
person who is qualified, or reasonably believed by the parties to be qualified, to perform
the ceremony. The parties must be physically present at the ceremony when it is per-
formed."
61. La. Civ. Code art. 94, comment (d) second para. (as amended by 1987 La. Acts
No. 886, § 1 (eff. Jan. 1, 1988)).
62. Op. Att'y Gen. 889 (1916-18). See discussion in Pascal and Spaht, Louisiana
Family Law Course 69-70 (4th ed. 1986).
63. La. Civ. Code art. 92 (as amended by 1987 La. Acts No. 886, § 1 (eff. Jan.
1, 1988)).
64. La. Civ. Code art. 92, comment (b) (as amended by 1987 La. Acts No. 886, §
I (eff. Jan. 1, 1988)).
65. La. R.S. 9:202 (as amended by 1987 La. Acts No. 886, § 3 (eff. Jan. 1, 1988)):
"A marriage ceremony may be performed by:
(1) A priest, minister, rabbi, clerk of the Religious Society of Friends, or any clergy
man of any religious sect, who is authorized by the authorities of his religion to perform
marriages, and who is registered to perform marriages ......
See also La. R.S. 9:204 (as amended by 1987 La. Acts No. 886, § 3 (eff. Jan. 1,
1988)):
An officiant, other than a judge or justice of the peace, may perform marriage
ceremonies only after he registers to do so by depositing with the clerk of court
of the parish in which he will principally perform marriage ceremonies, or, in
the case of Orleans Parish, with the office of the state registrar of vital records,
an affidavit stating his lawful name, denomination, and address.
66. La. R.S. 9:202 (as amended by 1987 La. Acts No. 886, § 3 (eff. Jan. 1, 1988)):
"A marriage ceremony may be performed by . . . (2) A judge or justice of the peace."
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marriages within certain terriorial limits. 67 "[A] person reasonably be-
lieved by the parties to be qualified" does not require that the officiant
be factually qualified, only that the parties are reasonable in believing
that he is. The change in statutory language to encompass such a
celebrant was in response to the fact that a Louisiana officiant not
authorized by law to perform marriage ceremonies did so and no one
was certain that the marriages were valid. The comment to article 91
expresses the opinion that a person reasonably believed to be qualified
would include "any member of the class of persons generally recognized
as empowered to perform such ceremonies, whether or not properly
registered to do S0.''68 The same comment to the article states: "The
expression [person who is reasonably believed by the parties to be
qualified] may be broadly construed to prevent the annulment of mar-
riages for technical reasons reasonably beyond the control of the intended
spouses." 69
Other ceremonial requirements, which do not affect the validity of
the marriage, appear in the Louisiana Revised Statutes. The officiant
may not perform a marriage without a marriage license 70 issued upon
presentation of a certified copy of each party's birth certificate, a medical
certificate,71 and the consent for a minor to marry, in writing72 or by
court authorization, 7 or both, if required. 74 The provisions of the Revised
Statutes which concern the medical certificate were also amended by
Act Number 830 to require testing for acquired immune deficiency
67. La. R.S. 9:203 (as amended by 1987 La. Acts No. 886, § 3 (eff. Jan. 1, 1988)).
68. La. Civ. Code art. 91, comment (c) (as amended by 1987 La. Acts No. 886, §
1 (eff. Jan. 1, 1988)).
69. Id.
70. La. R.S. 9:205 (as amended by 1987 La. Acts No. 886, § 3 (eff. Jan. 1, 1988)):
"A. (1) An officiant may not perform a marriage ceremony until he has received a license
authorizing him to perform that marriage ceremony."
71. La. R.S. 9:229 to 233 (as amended by 1987 La. Acts No. 886, § 3 (eff. Jan.
1, 1988)).
72. La. R.S. 9:211(A) (as amended by 1987 La. Acts No. 886, § 3 (eff. Jan. 1,
1988)).
73. La. R.S. 9:211(B), 212 (as amended by 1987 La. Acts No. 886, § 3 (eff. Jan.
1, 1988)).
74. La. R.S. 9:225 (as amended by 1987 La. Acts No. 886, § 3 (eff. Jan. 1, 1988)).
The documents (birth certificates, medical certificates, etc.) mentioned in the text are
to be accompanied by an application containing the following information:
(1) The date and hour of the applicaton;
(2) The full name, residence, race, and age of each party;
(3) The names of the parents of each party;
(4) The number of former marriages of each party, and whether divorced or
not; and
(5) The relationship of each party to the other.
La. R.S. 9:224 (as amended by 1987 La. Acts No. 886, § 3 (eff. Jan. 1, 1988)).
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syndrome (AIDS) antibodies. 7 If the tests are positive as to either party,
the couple may still marry after obtaining an affidavit from a licensed
physician that he has informed the parties of the test results and has
counseled them about AIDS.7 6 The only confusion caused by this ad-
ditional legislation is raised by the fee for the examination and certificate,
which section 232 states shall not exceed two dollars. 77 Section 232 did
not contemplate the fact that testing for AIDS is far more expensive
than two dollars. Thus, application of the fee limit to AIDS testing
would create a statutory conflict. The legislature probably did not intend
for section 232 to apply to AIDS testing.
71
The officiant is prohibited from performing the ceremony until
seventy-two hours after issuance of the license, 79 unless there is a judicial
waiver.8 0 The ceremony is to be performed in the presence of two
witnesses, 8' and a marriage certificate (marriage act) is to be prepared
in triplicate and signed by the parties, witnesses and officiant. a2 Op-
position to the marriage may be made by an oath of the party, and,
if the reason is sufficient by the judge, there will be a hearing. 3 If the
opposition is overruled, the objecting party bears the costs.8 4 The leg-
islation concerning opposition to the marriage previously appeared in
75. La. R.S. 9:230 (as amended by 1987 La. Acts No. 830, § 1 (eff. Jan. 1, 1988)).
See also La. R.S. 9:231(B) (as amended by 1987 La. Acts No. 830, § 1, No. 886, § 3
(eff. Jan. 1, 1988)).
An exception is made for persons who object to the tests on religious grounds as long
as the objection is that of both parties. La. R.S. 9:230(B) (4) (as amended by 1987 La.
Acts No. 830, § I (eff. Jan. 1, 1988)).
76. La. R.S. 9:230(B) (2) (as amended by 1987 La. Acts No. 830, § I (eff. Jan. 1,
1988)).
77. La. R.S. 9:232 (as amended by 1987 La. Acts No. 886, § 3 (eff. Jan. 1, 1988)).
78. La. R.S. 9:232 (as amended by 1987 La. Acts No. 886, § 3 (eff. Jan. 1, 1988))
provides: "If the applicant is indigent, a physician who is the coroner or a health officer
shall provide the examination and certificate at no charge to the applicant."
Yet, La. R.S. 9:230(B) (1) (as amended by 1987 La. Acts No. 830, § I (eff. Jan. 1,
1988)) provides: "The costs of tests required under this Subsection shall be paid by the
applicants." Subsection B applies only to AIDS testing, not that for gonococci, syphilis,
and other venereal diseases mentioned in subsection A.
79. La. R.S. 9:241, 243 (as amended by 1987 La. Acts No. 886, § 3 (eff. Jan. 1,
1988)).
80. La. R.S. 9:242 (as amended by 1987 La. Acts No. 886, § 3 (eff. Jan. 1, 1988)):
"A judge or justice of the peace authorized to perform the marriage may waive the
seventy-two hour delay upon application of the parties giving serious and meritorious
reasons. His certificate authorizing the immediate performance of the ceremony must be
attached to the marriage license."
81. La. R.S. 9:244 (as amended by 1987 La. Acts No. 886, § 3 (eff. Jan. 1, 1988)).
82. La. R.S. 9:245 (as amended by 1987 La. Acts No. 886, § 3 (eff. Jan. 1, 1988)).
83. La. R.S. 9:261 to 262 (as amended by 1987 La. Acts No. 886, § 3 (eff. Jan.
1, 1988)).
84. La. R.S. 9:263 (as amended by 1987 La. Acts No. 886, § 3 (eff. Jan. 1, 1988)).
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the Civil Code,85 but was removed to the Civil Code Ancillaries for the
same reason that the other ceremonial requirements were moved. New
sections appear in the Ancillaries reflecting the current practice of record
keeping by the state registrar of vital records. A consolidated form which
contains the application for the marriage license, content of the marriage
license authorizing the officiant to perform the marriage, and the mar-
riage certificate is authorized. 6
Free Consent
The third essential element of a valid marriage is free consent of
the parties to take each other as husband and wife, expressed at the
ceremony.8 7 The specific content of the consent, that being "to take
each other as husband and wife," was added to insure that future
ceremonies would make clear to the parties that marriage is what they
are contracting, rather than some informal union terminable at the
pleasure of either party.
"Consent is not free when given under duress or when given by a
person incapable of discernment.""8 Article 1819, prior to its amendment
in 1984, described consent as resulting from the deliberate and free
exercise of the will; thus, if consent were produced by error, fraud,
violence or threats, there was no consent at all.89 In the corresponding
article of the Civil Code which concerned consent to marriage, the term
free consent was also used. 90 Although the articles on conventional
obligations rarely use the term free consent, the article which lists reasons
85. La. Civ. Code arts. 106-108 (1870).
86. La. R.S. 9:251 (as amended by 1987 La. Acts No. 886, § 3 (eff. Jan. 1, 1988)).
See also La. R.S. 9:252 to 256 (as amended by 1987 La. Acts No. 886, § 3 (eff. Jan.
1, 1988)).
87. La. Civ. Code art. 87 (as amended by 1987 La. Acts No. 886, § 1 (eff. Jan.
1, 1988)).
88. La. Civ. Code art. 93 (as amended by 1987 La. Acts No. 886, § 1 (eff. Jan.
1, 1988)).
89. La. Civ. Code art. 1819 (1870):
Consent being the concurrence of intention in two or more persons, with regard
to a matter understood by all, reciprocally communicated, and resulting in each
party from a free and deliberate exercise of the will, it follows that there is
no consent, not only where the intent has not been mutually communicated or
implied, as is provided in the preceding paragraph, but also where it has been
produced by-
Error;
Fraud;
Violence;
Threats.
90. La. Civ. Code art. 91 (1870):
No marriage is valid to which the parties have not freely consented.
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why consent may be vitiated includes duress with error and fraud.91
The predecessor to new article 93 contained a list of circumstances
under which consent was considered not freely given. 92 The first two
circumstances mentioned, consent given to a ravisher and consent ex-
torted by violence, were replaced by one word in article 93-duress.
That word permits resort to articles 1959-1964 in the title "Conventional
Obligations" to resolve questions of what constitutes duress. 93 Analogy
to the predecessors of the same articles occurred under prior law. 94
The third example of defective consent listed in old article 91 was
that of a mistake respecting the person. 95 There is no corresponding
provision in article 93. The Committee felt that "mistake respecting the
person" had been so narrowly interpreted by the jurisprudence that it
Consent is not free:
1. When given to a ravisher, unless it has been given by the party ravished,
after she has been restored to the enjoyment of liberty;
2. When it is extorted by violence;
3. When there is a mistake respecting the person, whom one of the parties
intended to marry.
91. La. Civ. Code art. 1948 (as amended by 1984 La. Acts No. 331, § 1 (eff. Jan.
1; 1985)): "Consent may be vitiated by error, fraud, or duress."
But, La. Civ. Code art. 2031 (as amended by 1984 La. Acts No. 331, § 1 (eff. Jan.
1, 1985)), does refer to free consent: "A contract is relatively null when it violates a rule
intended for the protection of private parties, as when a party lacked capacity or did
not give free consent at the time the contract was made. A contract that is only relatively
null may be confirmed."
92. See supra text of La. Civ. Code art. 91 at note 90.
93. La. Civ. Code arts. 1959 (nature), 1960 (duress directed against third persons),
1961 (duress by third person), 1962 (threat of exercising a right), 1963 (contract with
party in good faith), 1964 (damages).
See comment (b) to La. Civ. Code art. 93 (as amended by 1987 La. Acts No. 886, §
I (eff. Jan. 1, 1988)):
As used in this Article, "duress" includes not only executed violence, but also
threatened violence, if the threat is pending at the time consent is given. This
usage is in keeping with the jurisprudence decided under the source provisions,
Articles 90 and 91 of the Civil Code of 1870 .... Threats of criminal prosecution,
as well as of violence, may render the consent procured thereby ineffective. ...
Applying by analogy Articles 1856 and 1857 of the Civil Code of 1870, the
courts have traditionally drawn a distinction between charges warranted by the
facts and those not: only marriages contracted under threat of the latter have
been invalidated .... Threats to reputation or fortune may be sufficient to
invalidate a marriage under this Article.
94. La. Civ. Code arts. 1850-1859 (1870); see LaCoste v. Guidroz, 47 La. Ann. 295,
16 So. 836 (1895); Grundmeyer v. Sander, 175 La. 189, 143 So. 45 (1932); Pray v. Pray,
128 La. 1037, 55 So. 666 (1911).
95. See supra text of La. Civ. Code art. 91 (1870) at note 90.
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was obsolete. In Delpit v. Young,96 this phrase was interpreted to include
only mistakes in physical identity. There was no Louisiana case in which
a marriage was annulled for mistake respecting the person. An argument
can be made that article 93 does not declare that the reasons for defective
consent are exclusive. Therefore, an aggravated case involving a mistake
in physical identity could be resolved by resort to the general articles
on error.97 A justification for resorting to those articles is that article
86 defines marriage as a relationship created by civil contract. 9 The
words civil contract were used for two reasons: (1) To demonstrate the
historical assertion of jurisdiction over marriage by secular authorities
and (2) To permit analogy to the law of conventional obligations when
appropriate.
Another instance of defective consent .o a marriage occurs when
consent is given by a person incapable of discernment. 99 A person
incapable of discernment includes "a person under the influence of
alcohol or drugs, a mentally retarded person, or a person who is too
young to understand the consequences of the marriage celebration."'°0
The terms "incapable of discernment" were borrowed from the Quebec
Civil Code,' 0 l as were the examples that appear in the comment to article
93. Although absent from the illustrative list, an insane person is men-
tioned in another comment as an example of a person who does not
96. 51 La. Ann. 923, 25 So. 547 (1899).
Comment (e) to La. Civ. Code art. 93 (as amended by 1987 La. Acts No. 886, § I
(eff. Jan. 1, 1988)) explains the Committee's reasoning as follows:
[Tihis Article omits reference to "mistake respecting the person" as a cause of
invalidity. The jurisprudence strictly interpreted that language as referring only
to mistakes of physical identity, and not to mistakes concerning some quality
or qualities of personality that one party believed the other to possess .... As
so limited, the omitted language was never applied to invalidate a marriage in
Louisiana.
97. No one suggested that error be extended to include the errors described in Delpit,
51 La. Ann. 923, 25 So. 547, as "when the one party mistakes the character, the social
standing, the pedigree, the acquirements, the pecuniary means, the habits, the temperament,
or the religion of the other, or when the one party, after the marriage, discovers 're-
dhibitory' vices in the other .... Id. at 550. See La. Civ. Code arts. 1948-1952.
98. La. Civ. Code art. 86 (as amended by 1987 La. Acts No. 886, § 1 (eff. Jan.
1, 1988)): "Marriage is a legal relationship between a man and a woman that is created
by civil contract."
99. La. Civ. Code art. 93 (as amended by 1987 La. Acts No. 886, § I (eff. Jan 1,
1988)).
100. La. Civ. Code art. 93, comment (d) (as amended by 1987 La. Acts No. 886, §
1 (eff. Jan. 1, 1988)).
101. Quebec Civ. Code art. 425 (rev. 1981): "A marriage contracted by a person
incapable of discernment may be declared null upon the application of his curator or of
either spouse."
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freely consent to marriage. 0 2 Under prior jurisprudence the insanity of
a party was considered as an instance where his consent to the marriage
was not freely given. 03 The consequence of such a conclusion was that
the marriage of the insane person was a relative nullity.104 Had insanity
created a lack of capacity to marry, the marriage would have been
absolutely null. 05 Continuing to characterize the marriage of an insane
person as relatively null due to a defect in consent was considered
socially desirable. Furthermore, expanding the language to encompass
mentally retarded persons and those under the influence of alcohol and
drugs resolved unanswered questions under prior law.'06 Since there is
no minimum age below which a marriage of minors will be considered
null, the Committee considered it advisable to permit the court to
examine the consent to marriage by a minor to determine if he was
too young to understand the consequences of the celebration.107
Absolutely Null Marriages
Marriages declared absolutely null by article 94 include those con-
tracted "without a marriage ceremony, by procuration, or in violation
of an impediment."'10 Under prior law, a marriage without a marriage
ceremony was considered as no marriage at all and as contracted "under
the other incapacities or nullities enumerated in the second chapter of
this title . . . . 109 The latter quoted language also encompassed marriages
102. La. Civ. Code art. 93, comment (c) (as amended by 1987 La. Acts No. 886, §
1 (eff. Jan. 1, 1988)): "Mere ignorance of the law is not sufficient to render a party's
consent unfree. Insanity may do so."
103. See Stier v. Price 214 La. 394, 37 So. 2d 847 (1948); Ducasse v. Ducasse's Heirs,
120 La. 731, 45 So. 565 (1908); Sabalot v. Populus, 31 La. Ann. 854 (1879).
In comment (c) to La. Civ. Code art. 93 (as amended by 1987 La. Acts No. 886, §
1 (eff. Jan. 1, 1988)):
As under prior jurisprudence, under this Article insanity is viewed as creating
a lack of free consent, rather than a lack of capacity to contract marriage; so
only the insane spouse may seek annulment of such a marriage .... Under
Article 95, infra, the spouse of a person of unsound mind has no standing to
bring an action to have the marriage annulled.
104. La. Civ. Code art. 110 (1870). See supra note 103.
105. La. Civ. Code art. 113 (1870).
106. See discussion in Pascal and Spaht, Louisiana Family Law Course 70-74 (4th ed.
1986). The title of the section which introduces the subject matter of the validity of such
marriages is "Questionable marriages not clearly declared null by the legislation."
107. La. Civ. Code art. 87, comment (b) (as amended by 1987 La. Acts No. 886, §
1 (eff. Jan. 1, 1988)). See also La. R.S. 9:211 to 214 (as amended by 1987 La. Acts
No. 886, § 3 (eff. Jan. 1, 1988)).
See discussion of similar problems under prior law in Pascal and Spaht, Louisiana
Family Law Course 70 (4th ed. 1986).
108. La. Civ. Code art. 94 (as amended by 1987 La. Acts No. 886, § I (eff. Jan.
1, 1988)).
109. La. Civ. Code art. 113 (1870).
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to which there was an impediment. ' '0 However, it was not clear under
article 113 if a marriage contracted by procuration was absolutely null,
since the prohibition appeared in the third chapter rather than the
second."' New article 94 clarifies the law in that respect.
The theoretical differences between absolute nullities and relative
nullities were maintained in the revision. Article 94 provides that if the
marriage is absolutely null no judicial declaration of nullity is required." 2
There are cross references to article 94 in the comments under the
articles prohibiting marriages by one already married,"' by persons of
the same sex," 4 and by persons related within the prohibited degrees."'
Because the absolutely null marriage is considered as if it never existed,
it does not prevent another marriage by one of the parties." 6 Even
though no declaration of nullity is required, an action to recognize it
may be brought by any interested person," 7 or it may be raised col-
laterally to assert a claim or as a defense to a claim by another."'
Rather than providing examples of "interested persons" who may bring
the action to recognize the nullity as prior law did," 9 the interpretation
of the words is left to the judiciary with the following admonition that
appears in comment (c) of article 94: "Because the prohibitions giving
110. La. Civ. Code arts. 93-95 (1870) appeared in Chapter 2 of Title IV-Of Husband
and Wife.
111. La. Civ. Code art. 113 (1870).
112. La. Civ. Code art. 94 (as amended by 1987 La. Acts No. 886, § 1 (eff. Jan.
1, 1988)).
113. La. Civ. Code art. 88, comment (b) (as amended by 1987 La. Acts No. 886, §
1 (eff. Jan. 1, 1988)).
114. La. Civ. Code art. 89, comments (b) (c) (as amended by 1987 La. Acts No. 886,
§ 1 (eff. Jan. 1, 1988)).
115. La. Civ. Code art. 90, comment (d) (as amended by 1987 La. Acts No. 886, §
1 (eff. Jan. 1, 1988)).
116. La. Civ. Code art. 88, comment (c) (as amended by 1987 La. Acts No. 886, §
I (eff. Jan. 1, 1988)): "An undissolved marriage is an impediment to either spouse's
subsequent marriage. A bigamous, incestuous, or otherwise absolutely null union is not.
A party to such a union may lawfully marry even though the nullity of his prior union
has never been judicially pronounced."
117. La. Civ. Code art. 94 (as amended by 1987 La. Acts No. 886, § 1 (eff. Jan.
1, 1988)). There is no longer a reference to the possibility of the action being instituted
by the Attorney General as there was in La. Civ. Code art. 113 (1870). The Council of
the Law Institute voted to eliminate it.
118. La. Civ. Code art. 94, comment (c) (as amended-by 1987 La. Acts No. 886, §
1 (eff. Jan. 1, 1988)):
The absolute nullity of a marriage may be raised in a direct action or collaterally,
either as the basis of a claim, or as a defense to a claim of another. McCaffrey
v. Benson, 38 La. Ann. 198 (1886); Summerlin v. Livingston, 15 La. Ann. 519
(La. 1860); Succession of Minvielle, 15 La. Ann. 342 (1860). See also Farrell
v. Farrell, 275 So. 2d 489 (1st Cir. 1973).
119. La. Civ. Code arts. 114, 116 (1870).
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rise to absolute nullity are matters of public order the class of persons
who may raise the issue is broadly defined. 1 20
Under prior law the article declaring marriages absolutely null con-
tained two additional provisions: (1) a retroactive validation of marriages
between those related within the prohibited degrees, if contracted in
another state where such marriages were not prohibited, and (2) a
prospective invalidation of marriages between Louisiana domiciliaries to
which there was an impediment under Louisiana law, if contracted in
another.state where such marriages were valid without first acquiring a
domicile there. 2' As to the first provision, which was similar to but
more narrow in scope than the provision in old article 95,122 the Com-
mittee decided to protect those persons whose marriages previously had
been declared legal, 23 but not to continue the practice. 24 The second
provision was considered unnecessary because of article 15 of the Civil
Code. Under the second paragraph of article 15, an act passed in one
country to have effect in another "is regulated by the laws of the
country where such acts are to have effect.' ' 25 The example given by
the redactors of the Civil Code of 1825 supports the view that the
second paragraph of article 15 applies to marriages: "Thus, a marriage
made in a foreign country between two inhabitants of this state, who
have not lost their domicile here, and who afterwards return here to
120. La. Civ. Code art. 94, comment (c) (as amended by 1987 La. Acts No. 886, §
1 (eff. Jan. 1, 1988)):
A bigamist may assert the nullity of his bigamous union. Clark v. Clark, 192
So. 2d 594 (3d Cir. 1966); Burrell v. Burrell, 154 So. 2d 103 (1st Cir. 1963).
The same right is extended to either party to a marriage that is invalid by
reason of the existence of any of the other listed impediments. See Rhodes v.
Miller, 189 La. 288, 179 So. 430 (1938); 1 M. Planiol, supra, no. 1035.
121. La. Civ. Code art. 113 (1870): [H]owever, first, that marriages heretofore con-
tracted between persons related within the prohibited degree either or both of
whom were then and afterwards domiciled in this State, and were prohibited
from intermarrying here, shall nevertheless be deemed valid in this State, where
such marriages were celebrated in other States or countries under the laws of
which they were not prohibited; second, that marriages hereafter contracted
between persons either or both of whom were domiciled in this State and are
forbidden to intermarry shall not be deemed valid in this State, because con-
tracted in another State or country where such marriages are not prohibited, if
the parties after such marriage, return to reside permanently in this State.
122. See supra note 12. See also La. Civ. Code art. 94, comment (d) (as amended
by 1987 La. Acts No. 886, § 1 (eff. Jan. 1, 1988)).
123. 1987 La. Acts No. 886, § 5 (eff. Jan. 1, 1988).
124. See supra note 12. See also La. Civ. Code art. 94, comment (d) (as amended
by 1987 La. Acts No. 886, § 1 (eff. Jan. 1, 1988)).
125. La. Civ. Code art. 15.
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reside, ought to be governed by our laws and not by those of the
country where the marriage was celebrated. '
126
Civil Effects of Absolutely Null Marriage
For the purpose of protecting the innocent party and children of
an absolutely null marriage, Louisiana has always recognized the ap-
plication of the "putative marriage" doctrine. 2 7 Consistently with prior
law, article 96 provides that the civil effects of a marriage flow in favor
of the party who contracted it in good faith "for as long as that party
remains in good faith.' ' 2 Furthermore, a marriage contracted by a party
in good faith produces civil effects "in favor of a child of the parties."' 2 9
As a general proposition, the Committee accepted as desirable social
policy the protection of (1) the children of a good faith marriage and
126. Projet of Civil Code of 1825, at 2 (La. St. L. Inst. transl. 1937). See also La.
Civ. Code art. 94, comment (d) (as amended by 1987 La. Acts No. 886, § 1 (eff. Jan.
1, 1988)). The comment continues by observing: "There is no reason to apply a different
rule to a fugitive marriage performed in another state, rather than a foreign country."
127. La. Civ. Code arts. 117-118 (1870).
128. La. Civ. Code art. 96 (as amended by 1987 La. Acts No. 886, § 1 (eff. Jan.
1, 1988)). See Evans v. Eureka Grand Lodge, 149 So. 305 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1933);
Patton v. Cities of Philadelphia and New Orleans, 1 La. Ann. 98 (1846).
As comment (b) to La. Civ. Code art. 96 (as amended by 1987 La. Acts No. 886, §
1 (eff. Jan. 1, 1988)) explains:
That rule [civil effects cease with bad faith] is not consistent with French law
under Articles 201 and 202 of the Code Napoleon, of which Articles 117 and
118 of the Civil Code of 1870 were literal translations. French courts hold that
civil effects cease to flow from a putative marriage only from the moment that
the parties' contractual marriage is declared null .... The contrary rule followed
in Louisiana had its source in Spanish law.
129. La. Civ. Code art. 96, third para. (as amended by 1987 La. Acts No. 886, § I
(eff. Jan. 1, 1988)). Cf. La. Civ. Code arts. 117-118 (1870). See discussion in Pascal and
Spaht, Louisiana Family Law Course 351 (4th ed. 1986).
The child extended the benefits of the civil effects of marriage, including the presumption
of legitimacy (La. Civ. Code art. 184), legitimation by subsequent marriage (La. Civ.
Code art. 198) and the rights and obligations owed by parents to children (La. Civ. Code
arts. 215-237), must be that of the two parties.
In its discussions, the Committee expressed sympathy for the child of an absolutely
null marriage when both parties are in bad faith. The concern prompted the following
Committee proposal, ultimately rejected by the Committee: "An absolutely null marriage
produces its civil effects in favor of any child conceived or born during the marriage."
Minutes of Committee Meeting of October, 1982. Later Committee deliberations revealed
the difficulty of distinguishing absolutely null marriages contracted without a marriage
ceremony from informal unions (or common law marriages). The result under the proposal
is that children would have been considered legitimate even though the parents may have
never intended to marry. The Committee ultimately decided to consider the status of the
offspring of absolutely null bad faith marriages in the revision of the law of filiation,
possibly exempting such children from the necessity of instituting the filiation action
required by La. Civ. Code art. 209.
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(2) the spouse who contracted the marriage in good faith, but only so
long as he remains in good faith. Termination of the civil effects of
marriage with bad faith forces the spouse or spouses to do something
to cure the nullity or to end a relationship which society does not
condone.
A prerequisite to the application of the putative marriage doctrine
is contracting the marriage in good faith. The word contracting suggests
a ceremony, which would mean that a marriage that is absolutely null
because of no ceremony 3 ° would never produce civil effects. The pred-
ecessor to article 96 also used the word contracted, but the jurisprudence
extended the doctrine in Succession of Marinonil' to protect a good
faith spouse to a marriage even though there was no ceremony, only
the issuance of a marriage license. The comments explain the current
state of the jurisprudence and conclude i ith the following statement:
"The ultimate decision whether to follow Succession of Marinoni in
preference to the two contrary cases previously cited, however, is left
to the discretion of the court under this revision.' ' 32
"Good faith" is not defined by the legislation, and the comments
explain that article 96 was not intended "to disturb the prior jurispru-
dence construing the term 'good faith' in this context."' 133 Good faith
means "an honest and reasonable belief that the marriage was valid,
and there existed no legal impediment thereto."'13 4 It is a question of
fact and must be decided according to the circumstances of each case.'"
130. La. Civ. Code art. 94 (as amended by 1987 La. Acts No. 886, § 1 (eff. Jan.
1, 1988)).
131. 183 La. 776, 164 So. 797 (1935). But see Succession of Rossi, 214 So. 2d 223
(La. App. 4th Cir.), writ denied, 253 La. 66, 216 So. 2d 309 (1968).
132. La. Civ. Code art. 96, comment (e) (as amended by 1987 La. Acts No. 886, §
1 (eff. Jan. 1, 1988)): "That holding [Succession of Marinoni, see supra note 131] could,
in a proper case, form the basis for the application of the putative marriage doctrine to
a marriage that was absolutely null under Article 94, supra, because contracted without
a ceremony."
133. La. Civ. Code art. 96, comment (d) (as amended by 1987 La. Acts No. 886, §
1 (eff. Jan. 1, 1988)).
134. Smith v. Smith, 43 La. Ann. 1140, 1144, 10 So. 248, 250 (1891). See also Jones
v. Squire, 137 La. 883, 69 So. 733 (1915).
See also La. Civ. Code art. 96, comment (d) (as amended by 1987 La. Acts No. 886,
§ I (eff. Jan. 1, 1988)):
Such a good faith belief may arise from an error of law, as well as of fact.
Succession of Pigg, 228 La. 799, 84 So. 2d 196 (1955) (putative wife relied
upon husband's fraudulent divorce from first wife); Funderburk v. Funderburk,
214 La. 717, 38 So. 2d 502 (1949) (putative wife relied upon null divorce
obtained in a court of improper venue).
135. Succession of Chavis, 211 La. 313, 29 So. 2d 860 (1947); Gathright v. Smith,
368 So. 2d 679 (La. 1978); Succession of Gordon, 461 So. 2d 357 (La. App. 2d Cir.
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Consistently with prior law, good faith is presumed, 3 6 except if a spouse
was a party to a prior undissolved marriage. In the latter case, the
spouse bears the burden of proving his good faith.'3 7
The change that article 96 makes in prior law is an exception to
the general proposition that civil effects cease simultaneously with good
faith. Under the second paragraph of article 96, "[w]hen the cause of
the nullity is one party's prior undissolved marriage, the civil effects
continue in favor of the other party, regardless of whether the latter
remains in good faith, until the marriage is pronounced null or the
latter party contracts a valid marriage."'' ' The special extension of civil
effects to a spouse in bad faith is limited to a marriage that is absolutely
null by virtue of a prior undissolved marriage.' 39 The article does not
extend the benefits of civil effects to a bad faith spouse if the marriage
is absolutely null because of the relationship of the parties' 40 or because
the marriage was contracted without a ceremony or by procuration.1 4
Originally, the Committee had proposed extending the special rule to a
1985), writ denied, 464 So. 2d 319 (La. 1985); Rebouche v. Anderson, 505 So. 2d 808
(La. App. 2d Cir. 1987); Mara v. Mara, 452 So. 2d 329 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1984); Mabry
v. Mabry, 452 So. 2d 248 (La. App. 5th Cir. 1984); Freet v. Freet, 442 So. 2d 1366
(La. App. 3d Cir. 1983); Hart v. Hart, 427 So. 2d 1341 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1983).
136. Gathright v. Smith, 368 So. 2d 679 (La. 1978).
137. La. Civ. Code art. 96, comment (d) (as amended by 1987 La. Acts No. 886, §
I (eff. Jan. 1, 1988)); Gathright, 368 So. 2d 679.
138. La. Civ. Code art. 96, second para. (as amended by 1987 La. Acts No. 886, §
1 (eff. Jan. 1, 1988)).
139. La. Civ. Code art. 96 (as amended by 1987 La. Acts No. 886, § 1 (eff. Jan.
1, 1988)).
The special extension of time granted by the second sentence of this Article
does not benefit a good faith party who has contracted an absolutely null
marriage in ignorance of the continued existence of a prior marriage of his
own. The equitable considerations that justify the extension do not apply in
such a case.
Id. comment (c).
The Council of the Institute during the initial consideration of the Committee's proposal
amended the provision to extend the benefits of civil effects to the bad faith bigamist.
There was concern that it was unfair to treat the bigamist, who had originally been in
good faith, differently from the other spouse. The hypothetical example was given of the
second bigamous marriage being contracted under the mistaken belief that the divorce
was final or that a foreign divorce was entitled to full faith and credit. During the
Council's second consideration of the subject, upon the recommendation of the Committee,
the special extension of benefits was limited to the "innocent" spouse. The limitation of
the extension is very similar to the jurisprudence limiting the presumption of good faith
to the spouse without an impediment. See supra notes 136 and 137.
140. La. Civ. Code arts. 90, 94 (as amended by 1987 La. Acts No. 886, § 1 (eff.
Jan. 1, 1988)).
141. La. Civ. Code arts. 92, 94 (as amended by 1987 La. Acts No. 886, § I (eff.
Jan. 1, 1988)).
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marriage that is null because there is no ceremony. 142 However, members
of the Committee ultimately decided that the relevant events which would
result in the termination of civil effects were too vague, and thus
potentially productive of extensive litigation.
The special extension of civil effects favors only the party whose
spouse had a prior undissolved marriage. Because it is an extension,
the spouse who seeks the benefit of the second paragraph of article 96
must first prove he or she contracted the marriage in good faith.
Thereafter, upon discovery of the impediment (the prior undissolved
marriage of the other spouse) civil effects continue to flow. The other
spouse whose prior marriage created the impediment does not enjoy the
continuation of civil effects. 143 The Committee felt that the spouse whose
impediment caused the nullity should remain motivated to cure the
defective marriage, either by remarrying the putative spouse once the
impediment is removed or by obtaining a judicial declaration of nullity.
The other "innocent" spouse can only rectify the defect by obtaining
a judicial declaration of nullity.'" Furthermore, if civil effects cease
upon receiving information concerning the impediment, the spouse whose
142. The Committee proposal read:
Also, when a marriage is absolutely null because contracted without a ceremony
or by procuration, .a party who contracts the marriage in good faith and who
is willing to contract a legal marriage is entitled to the civil effects of marriage
until the marriage is declared null or until the other party is willing to contract
a legal marriage.
Minutes of Committee Meeting of July, 1982 (emphasis added).
The italicized language was simply too vague a standard to use in identifying the date
upon which civil effects would cease. Considering the absolutely null marriage to which
the provision applied, it would be difficult to establish the moment civil effects began.
Furthermore, how was a party to prove he had been willing to contract a legal marriage.
The Committee ultimately concluded that the situation to which the provision would apply
was exceptional (good faith if no ceremony) and an attempt to protect the few innocent
parties would run the risk of creating problems of proof and increased litigation.
143. La. Civ. Code art. 96, comment (c) (as amended by 1987 La. Acts No. 886, §
1 (eff. Jan. 1, 1988)). See supra text of comment in note 139.
144. La. Civ. Code art. 96, comment (b) (as amended by 1987 La. Acts No. 886, §
1 (eff. Jan. 1, 1988)):
This Article abrogates the traditional Louisiana rule in one very specific situation:
where a party has acted in good faith in contracting a marriage that is absolutely
null because the other party was already married at the time of contracting. In
that situation the party whose prior undissolved marriage is the cause of nullity
is the one who has the dispositive power to rectify the nullity (by divorcing his
former spouse and remarrying his present one). The other party cannot do so.
Thus, in that situation it is unfair to divest the latter of his putative spouse
status as of the time that he learns of the cause of nullity. In so doing, the
traditional Louisiana rule placed the party whose prior marriage was the cause
of nullity in a better position than the one who had had no part in causing
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impediment caused the absolutely null marriage may control the flow
of civil effects to the other spouse. These equitable considerations per-
suaded the Committee to extend civil effects to the "innocent" spouse
even after this spouse is in bad faith, until there is a judicial declaration
of nullity obtained by either spouse or until the "innocent" spouse
contracts another marriage with either the "bad faith" spouse or a third
person. 145
Since the special extension changes the law, the question of retro-
activity may arise. Nothing in the Act gives any direction about ret-
roactivity, and it thus can be argued that the new provision applies to
parties to an absolutely null bigamous marriage who are in good faith
on January 1, 1988.146 The legislative change is not merely procedural,
thus applying retroactively absent a declaration of legislative will to the
contrary. 47 Bad faith has legal effects which concern substantive rights,
those of ownership of property under a community property regime. 48
The legal consequences attach at the moment of bad faith. However,
"the moment" suggests a finite point in time at which the law denies
to a spouse the civil effects. Good and bad faith are factual questions
and are dependent in many cases upon an accumulation of facts. How-
ever, similar problems of retroactivity occurred when article 155 was
amended to provide that the community of acquets and gains is rees-
tablished between judicially separated spouses upon a factual reconcil-
iation. 49 In that instance, the jurisprudence has refused to apply the
amended version of the article to couples reconciled before the effective
date of the Act. 50
145. La. Civ. Code art. 96, comment (b) (as amended by 1987 La. Acts No. 886, §
1 (eff. Jan. 1, 1988)). The civil effects terminate when the "innocent" spouse contracts
another marriage, whether with a bad faith spouse or with a third person. Cessation of
civil effects with a legal marriage to another was designed to prevent the possibility of
"double dipping" into two community regimes.
146. La. Civ. Code art. 8, interpreted and applied in Tullier v. Tullier, 464 So. 2d
278 (La. 1985), and Graham v. Sequoya Corp. 478 So. 2d 1223 (La. 1985). See also La.
R.S. 1:2 (1973); Johnson, Developments in the Law, 1983-1984-Legislation-Procedure
and Interpretation, 45 La. L. Rev. 341 (1984).
147. Wall v. Close, 201 La. 986, 10 So. 2d 779 (1942); Shreveport Long Leaf Lumber
Co. v. Wilson, 195 La. 814, 197 So. 566 (1940); State v. Bezett, 158 La. 309, 104 So.
55 (1925); Johnson v. Fournet, 387 So. 2d 1336 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1980); Manuel v.
Carolina Cas. Ins. Co., 136 So. 2d 275 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1961).
148. Tennant v. Russell, 214 La. 1046, 39 So. 2d 726 (1949); Rico v. Vangundy, 461
So. 2d 458 (La. App. 5th Cir. 1984); Draughn v. Mart, 411 So. 2d 1188 (La. App. 4th
Cir. 1982).
149. La. Civ. Code art. 155(B) (as amended by 1985 La. Acts No. 525, § I (eff. Jan.
1, 1988)). See discussion in Spaht, Developments in the Law, 1984-1985-Persons, 46 La.
L. Rev. 613, 619 (1986).
150. Conner v. Conner, 515 So. 2d 468 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1987).
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Relatively Null Marriages and Their Civil Effects
A marriage is relatively null if the consent of one of the parties is
not free, that is, obtained by duress or given by a person incapable of
discernment.' As in the case of other relatively null contracts,1 2 only
the person whose consent was not freely given may seek to have the
marriage declared null.'53 However, the person whose consent was not
freely given will be barred from annulling the marriage if he confirms 154
the marriage "after recovering his liberty or regaining his discern-
ment."' 55 Thus, the law pertaining to relatively null marriages did not
change substantially.' 56
The word confirm was substituted for cohabitation'5 7 as a means
of curing the relatively null marriage. The choice was purposeful. The
broader term confirm permits evidence of acts other than sexual inter-
course to prove an intention to cure the defective marriage. For example,
by resort to general obligations theory,'58 "under Civil Code Article
1842 (rev. 1984) a party who had married under duress could confirm
the marriage by express declaration." '1 9
Although article 95 had originally included the clause "or his legal
representative," it was eliminated by the Council of the Institute. The
purpose of the clause was to permit such an individual to annul the
marriage of the party who did not freely consent. The Committee had
proposed the language to afford relief from the civil effects of the
151. La. Civ. Code art. 95 (as amended by 1987 La. Acts No. 886, § I (eff. Jan.
1, 1988)). See also La. Civ. Code art. 93 (as amended by 1987 La. Acts No. 886, § I
(eff. Jan. 1, 1988)).
152. La. Civ. Code art. 2031.
153. La. Civ. Code art. 95 (as amended by 1987 La. Acts No. 886, § 1 (eff. Jan.
1, 1988)): "Such a marriage may be declared null upon application of the party whose
consent was not free."
154. See La. Civ. Code art. 1842.
155. La. Civ. Code art. 95 (as amended by 1987 La. Acts No. 886, § 1 (eff. Jan.
1, 1988)).
156. Stier v. Price, 214 La. 394, 37 So. 2d 847 (1948); Succession of Varth, 178 La.
847, 152 So. 543 (1934). See discussion in Pascal and Spaht, Louisiana Family Law
Course 56-57 (4th ed. 1986).
157. La. Civ. Code art. 111 (1870).
158. La. Civ. Code art. 1842:
Confirmation is the declaration whereby a person cures the relative nullity of
an obligation.
An express act of confirmation must contain or identify the substance of the
obligation and evidence the intention to cure its relative nullity.
Tacit confirmation may result from voluntary performance of the obligation.
159. La. Civ. Code art. 95, comment (c) (as amended by 1987 La. Acts No. 886, §
1 (eff. Jan. 1, 1988)).
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relatively null marriage'6 to the person who was incapable of discernment
and might lack procedural capacity. 16 1 Identical language had been used
by the court in Stier v. Price.162 However, when the language "or his
legal representative" was considered by the Council, the quoted words
were removed by amendment. There was concern expressed that the
language was simply too broad and could include an executor or ad-
ministrator of a spouse's estate after his death. 163 The additional ob-
servation was made that the curator of an interdict would have the
power to institute the nullity action under the Louisiana Code of Civil
Procedure articles specifying the powers of the curator. 16 Subsequent
attempts by the Committee to define the legal representative more broadly
than a curator yet more narrowly than a legal representative after death
were unsuccessful.
As under prior law, "[a] relatively null marriage produces civil effects
until it is declared null."' 65 A relatively null marriage always has been
treated as valid until annulled by judicial declaration, despite theoretical
objections.' s6 One result of such a rule is that a relatively null marriage,
unlike one that is absolutely null, does create an impediment to a
subsequent marriage.
Incidents and Effects of Marriage
The Committee decided early in its deliberations to reject greater
regulation of the marital relationship. 167 As under previous law, once
160. La. Civ. Code art. 97 (as amended by 1987 La. Acts No. 886, § I (eff. Jan.
1, 1988)).
161. La. Code Civ. P. arts. 428, 682, 684.
162. 214 La. 394, 37 So. 2d 847 (1948). In that opinion, the court made the following
statement:
As to plaintiff's contention in regard to the lack of consent on the part of the
husband, if he did not consent to the marriage due to his mental condition,
under the provisions of Article 110 he or his legal representatives are the only
persons who can be heard to complain.
Id. at 400, 37 So. 2d at 849-50 (emphasis added).
163. La. Code Civ. P. art. 3211. See also La. Code Civ. P. art. 426.
164. La. Code Civ. P. arts. 684, 4262, 4555. See the discussion of the curator's powers
in Note, Omnipotent or Impotent? The Curator's Role in Separation and Divorce, 43
La. L. Rev. 1017 (1983).
165. La. Civ. Code art. 97 (as amended by 1987 La. Acts No. 886, § 1 (eff. Jan.
1, 1988)). The comment to art. 97 adds:
This Article is new, but it does not change the law. In Louisiana the relatively
null marriage has long been regarded as valid until annulled by a judicial decree
rendered in a direct action of nullity brought by a property party, as defined
in Article 110 of the Civil Code of 1870.
166. See discussion in Pascal and Spaht, Louisiana Family Law Course 56-57 (4th ed.
1986).
167. The Committee considered and ultimately rejected imposition of the following
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the legal relationship is created, the revision continues a trend of per-
mitting the private ordering of the relationship by the spouses. The law
imposes few personal obligations upon the spouses. 6 The obligations
imposed, however, are so fundamental that they are to be considered
generally as matters of public order. 69 During the marriage the spouses
are prohibited from suing each other to enforce such obligations. 70
personal obligations:
(a) requiring the spouses to live together (source: Quebec Civ. Code (rev. 1981))
(rejected: Civil Code should remain silent on whether spouses are obligated to live together,
given the increasing number of spouses who are prevented from doing so by the demands
of their careers);
(b) requiring the spouses to contribute'to the expenses of their marriage in proportion
to their respective means (source: Quebec Civ. Code art. 445 (rev. 1981)) (rejected:
interspousal bar to suit should not be lifted and judges as arbiters of family financial
disputes would be likely to impair family harmony and to seriously overburden the courts);
(c) providing that spouses must choose the principal family residence together (source:
Quebec Civ. Code art. 444 (rev. 1981)) (rejected: same reasons as in (a) and (b));
(d) providing that neither spouse may alienate or encumber the principal family res-
idence without consent of the other (source: Quebec Civ. Code art. 452 (rev. 1981))
(rejected: a spouse's right over his separate property should not be thus restricted).
Minutes of Committee Meetings of May, 1982.
168. La. Civ. Code art. 98 (as amended by 1987 La. Acts No. 886, § 1 (eff. Jan.
1, 1988)): "Married persons owe each other fidelity, support, and assistance."
1987 La. Acts No. 886, § 1 (eff. Jan. 1, 1988)) (amending La. Civ. Code art. 98,
comment (c)): "The husband's special additional obligation to provide his wife with the
conveniences of life, formerly imposed by Article 120 of the Civil Code of 1870, was
abrogated by the legislature in Acts 1985, No. 271, and likewise has been suppressed in
this revision."
1987 La. Acts No. 886, § 1 (eff. Jan. 1, 1988)) (amending La. Civ. Code art. 98,
comment (f)):
This revision has not carried forward the unconstitutional provision of Article
120 of the Civil Code of 1870 whereby the husband had the exclusive right to
choose the location of the matrimonial dwelling and the wife had a concomitant
duty to reside there. See Crosby v. Crosby, 434 So. 2d 162 (La. App. 5th Cir.
1983) (provision held unconstitutional on both state and federal grounds). That
provision was repealed by the Louisiana Legislature by Acts 1985, No. 271.
Under this revision the spouses are free to live together as necessary to fulfill
their obligation mutually to support, assist, and be faithful to each other.
For a discussion of the effect of the repeal of La. Civ. Code art. 120 (1870), see
Spaht, Developments in the Law, 1984-1985-Persons, 46 La. L. Rev. 613 (1986).
La. Civ. Code art. 98 (as amended by 1987 La. Acts No. 886, § 1 (eff. Jan. 1, 1988))
and Chapter 3 (Incidents and Effects of Marriage) concern only interspousal personal
rights and obligations, not patrimonial rights. See comment (g) to La. Civ. Code art. 98
(as amended by 1987 La. Acts No. 886, § 1 (eff. Jan. 1, 1988)).
169. La. Civ. Code art. 98, comment (e) (as amended by 1987 La. Acts No. 886, §
I (eff. Jan. 1, 1988)): "The spouses' duties under this Article, as a general rule, are
matters of public order from which they may not derogate by contract."
170. La. R.S. 9:291 (Supp. 1987). See also La. Civ. Code art. 98, comment (d) (as
amended by 1987 La. Acts No. 886, § 1 (eff. Jan. 1, 1988)). The last sentence of the
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With identical terminology to that of its predecessor,' 7' article 98
imposes the mutual obligations of fidelity, support, and assistance. 72
Fidelity refers to the obligation to refrain from adultery 73  and "to
submit to each other's reasonable and normal sexual desires. 1 1 74 Support
includes not only food, clothing and shelter but also the cost "of
operating such conveniences as telephones, home appliances, and an
automobile.'7 Assistance, to the extent that it is different from that
of support, includes "the personal care to be given an ill and infirm
spouse."'1
7 6
For the first time, explicitly as an incident of marriage, the law
provides that "[s]pouses mutually assume the moral and material di-
rection of the family, exercise parental authority, and assume the moral
and material obligations resulting therefrom. ' 77 The source of the article
comment refers to an interim spousal allowance, which is a term of art used in the Law
Institute's proposed draft revising the law of spousal support to be introduced at the
1988 Legislative Session.
171. La. Civ. Code art. 119 (1870): "The husband and wife owe to each other mutually,
fidelity, support and assistance."
172. La. Civ. Code art. 98 (as amended by 1987 La. Acts No. 886, § 1 (eff. Jan.
1, 1988)). For the text of the article see supra note 168.
173. See La. Civ. Code art. 138 (1870) (separation from bed and board) and art. 139
(1870) (divorce).
174. La. Civ. Code art. 98, comment (b) (as amended by 1987 La. Acts No. 886, §
I (eff. Jan. 1, 1988)):
As used in this Article, the term "fidelity" refers not only to the spouses' duty
to refrain from adultery, but also to their mutual obligation to submit to each
other's reasonable and normal sexual desires. The jurisprudence has held that
the latter obligation is a necessary concomitant of marriage. Favrot v. Barnes,
332 So. 2d 873 (La. App. 4th Cir.), writ denied, 334 So. 2d 436 (La.), reversed
in part on other grounds, 339 So. 2d 843 (La. 1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S.
961, 97 S. Ct. 387 (1976); Phillpott v. Phillpott, 285 So. 2d 570 (La. App. 4th
Cir. 1973), writ refused, 288 So. 2d 643 (La. 1974); Mudd v. Mudd, 206 La.
1055, 20 So. 2d 311 (1944).
175. La. Civ. Code art. 98, comment (c) (as amended by 1987 La. Acts No. 886, §
I (eff. Jan. 1, 1988)):
The jurisprudence decided under the source provision has held that the spouses'
duty to support each other is limited to furnishing the necessities of life. ....
Nevertheless the term 'support' has been construed to include the cost not only
of food, clothing, and shelter, but also of operating such conveniences as.
telephones, home appliances, and an automobile. Bernhardt v. Bernhardt, 283
So. 2d 226 (La. 1973) ....
176. La. Civ. Code art. 98, comment (c) (as amended by 1987 La. Acts No. 886, §
1 (eff. Jan. 1, 1988)): "The duty to render assistance, insofar as it is separate-from that
of support, includes the personal care to be given an ill or infirm spouse. . . . James v.
State Through Board of Administrators of Charity Hospital, 154 So. 2d 497 (La. App.
4th Cir. 1963)." See also Dollar v. Dollar, 159 La. 219, 105 So. 296 (1925), noted in
Pascal and Spaht, Louisiana Family Law Course 111 (4th ed. 1986).
177. La. Civ. Code art. 99 (as amended by 1987 La. ActsNo. 886, §.1 (eff. Jan.
1, 1988)).
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is Quebec Civil Code article 443. 18 It describes the assumption of control
over the moral and material direction of the family and states a general
principle of equality between the spouses in exercising that control.179
It serves as an introduction to the more specific chapter on parental
authority, which presently does not reflect the general principle of equal-
ity.°80 The chapter of the Civil Code devoted to the authority of parents
over their children will be revised in the future.
Article 100 is new and is included in the revision for the purpose
of resolving a conflict under the jurisprudence."" Under the article, the
legal name of each spouse remains unchanged by marriage; however,
"a married person may use the surname of either or both spouses as
a surname."' 82 As an example, a woman's name does not change upon
marriage such that she can seek to change her name on her birth
certificate.' 83 The privilege enjoyed by the wife as a matter of custom
178. Quebec Civ. Code art. 443 (rev. 1981). "The spouses together take in hand the
moral and material direction of the family, exercise parental authority and assume the
tasks resulting therefrom." Id.
179. La. Civ. Code art. 99 (as amended by 1987 La. Acts No. 886, § I (eff. Jan.
1, 1988)). The comment to art. 99 provides: "This Article is new. It states a general
principle of equality between the spouses in the moral and material direction of the
family."
180. La. Civ. Code art. 216 (1870): "A child remains under the authority of his father
and mother until his majority or emancipation.
In case of differences between the parents, the authority of the father prevails."
The article is contained in Section 1 of Chapter 5 (Of Paternal Authority) of Title VII
of Book I of the Civil Code.
181. La. Civ. Code art. 100, comment (a) (as amended by 1987 La. Acts No. 886,
§ I (eff. Jan. 1, 1988)):
This Article is new. It resolves a conflict in Louisiana jurisprudence. Compare
Succession of Kneipp, 172 La. 411, 134 So. 376 (1931) (legal surname of a
married woman is her maiden name), with Wilty v. Jefferson Parish Democratic
Executive Committee, 157 So. 2d 718 (La. 1963) (legal surname of a married
woman is her husband's surname).
182. La. Civ. Code art. 100 (as amended by 1987 La. Acts No. 886, § I (eff. Jan.
1, 1988)): "Marriage does not change the name of either spouse. However, a married
person may use the surname of either or both spouses as a surname."
183. La. Civ. Code art. 100, comment (b) (as amended by 1987 La. Acts No. 886,
§ 1 (eff. Jan. 1, 1988)):
Under this Article the legal name of each spouse remains unchanged by marriage,
although the spouses are entitled to use each other's names as a matter of
custom. Thus, the legal name of a spouse cannot be changed on his birth
certificate, as maintained by the state registrar of vital statistics, simply as a
result of the marriage. See R.S. 40:34. Only a name change effected by an
action under R.S. 13:4751-4755, or by an adoption pursuant to R.S. 9:421-462,
or by virtue of a legitimation under R.S. 40:46A, can be given this ultimate
legal effect. R.S. 40:34 (A)(l)(a)(v) (rev. 1979); See also R.S. 40:75. However,
either spouse may validly sign documents either with his spouse's surname or
with a combination of his and his spouse's surname.
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to use the name of her husband is extended to the husband, with the
additional possibility of some hyphenated version of both surnames.'
4
While considering the rights and obligations of married persons, the
Committee discussed the problem of cohabitants and potential legislative
solutions. After lengthy Committee and Council debate, an article was
proposed that extended to cohabitants, neither of whom were married
to another, the limited right to contract in writing.' a The proposed
article passed the House and Senate Committees and the House Floor,
but was removed by amendment on the Senate Floor. At the same time
the Senate passed a bill repealing article 1481 which prohibited certain
donations between those persons living in open concubinage. s6 Both
actions may ultimately have some effect upon contracts entered into
between cohabitants. 8 7
Conclusion
The. process of revision of the law relating to marriage and the
family has begun. The first phase is completed. Although the new
provisions which appear in the Civil Code and Civil Code Ancillaries
make only a few substantive changes, the sheer number of statutes has
been significantly reduced. The revised Civil Code articles are brief and
direct and contain only the essential substantive provisions. The Louis-
iana Revised Statutes are more detailed and supplement the concise
provisions of the Civil Code.
During the 1988 Legislative Session, the revised Civil Code articles
on divorce, spousal support, claims for contributions to a spouse's
184. La. Civ. Code art. 100, comment (c) (as amended by 1987 La. Acts No. 886,
§ I (eff. Jan. 1, 1988)):
As regards the wife's name, the rules adopted by this Article are those followed
in French law .... and the same rules are applied to the husband under this
revision. It has been held that these rights continue after the marriage has
ended. Welcker v. Welcker, 342 So. 2d 251 (La. App. 4th Cir.), writ denied
343 So. 2d 1077 (La. 1977). Contra, 1 M. Planiol, supra note 15, No. 395.
185. H.B. 1139 Reg. Sess. (1987), proposed La. Civ. Code art. 101: "An otherwise
valid contract is not rendered unenforceable solely because the parties, neither of whom
was married, were cohabitants at the time of contracting but such a contract must be in
writing."
Cohabitants was defined in comment (c) as persons who live together in a companionate
sexual relationship.
186. La. Civ. Code art. 1481 (1870) (repealed by 1987 La. Acts No. 468, § 1):
Those who have lived together in open concubinage are respectively incapable
of making to each other, whether inter vivos or mortis causa, any donation of
immovables; and if they make a donation of movables, it can not exceed one-
tenth part of the whole value of their estate.
Those who afterwards marry are excepted from this rule.
187. For a discussion of the potential impact, see Note, 48 La. L. Rev. (1988).
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education, child custody, child support and other relief incidental to
divorce will be previewed. That work product will represent the com-
pletion of -the second phase of the revision.
Much still remains to be done. Filiation, with the inherent problems
of dual paternity, scientific advances in paternity testing, surrogate moth-
erhood, artificial insemination, and in vitro fertilization, presents a for-
midable challenge. Implementing the principle of equality between parents
in exercising authority over their children will require extensive com-
parative research for acceptable solutions to irresolvable parental con-
flicts. The Civil Code articles on tutorship need to 'be compatible with
the parallel institution of custody, and the articles governing interdiction
have not been evaluated critically in years.
At least another six years of work will be required to finish the
task of family law revision. The law regulating the interrelationship of
family members and their relationship to the rest of society touches the
lives of every citizen of this state. For that reason, the revision must
proceed slowly and cautiously, and only after lenthy consideration and
deliberation. Hence one "baby" step at a time is an appropriate pace.
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